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SERVING MULTIPLE MASTERS: CONFRONTING THE 
CONFLICTING INTERESTS THAT ARISE IN 
SUPERFUND DISPUTES 
Patrick E. Donovan * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The belief that "[n]o man can serve two masters"l is as old as the 
Bible. Today's legal community, however, does not entirely submit 
to this belief as multiple representations2 have become the double-
edged sword of modern legal practice. On one edge lies the possibility 
of multiple successes, including the praise of the legal community, 
enhanced reputations for the firm and the attorneys involved, and 
an expanded client list. The other edge, however, can twist what 
could have been a promising representation into a complex web of 
conflicting interests if one or more of the clients' interests becomes 
adverse. Continued representation of parties despite the existence 
of a conflict of interest can seriously injure a firm's reputation, and 
can potentially result in monetary damages and disciplinary action 
against the firm and the individual attorneys involved. 3 
For these reasons, large firms fear involvement in a serious conflict 
of interest more than any other ethical problem except, perhaps, 
encountering personal dishonesty within the firm membership.4 It is 
* Production Editor, 1989-90, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
I Matthew 6:24. 
2 Unless otherwise noted, the term "multiple representation" is used in this Comment in 
its most basic definition: the service of two or more clients in the same matter at the same 
time. 
3 See G. HAZARD, JR. & W. HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE 
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 126-27 (1986 Supp.) [hereinafter HANDBOOK ON 
THE MODEL RULES]. The authors of this Handbook suggest that, as the law of conflicts of 
interest becomes more clearly established, it will be enforced through the disciplinary process 
and malpractice actions. Id. 
4 G. HAZARD, JR., ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 83 (1978). 
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a fear that is not easily reconciled with the modern practice of law, 
leading one commentator to observe that "the lawyer with conflicting 
interests has provided bench and [B]ar with one of the toughest 
problems in legal ethics."5 The continuing growth and diversification 
of today's law firms aggravate this problem and have made conflicts 
checks a necessity, rather than a superfluous precaution. A clear 
example of the problems that conflicts of interest pose to large 
complex practices can be found in environmental law. In an environ-
mental lawsuit, large firms are more likely to undertake multiple 
representations, due to the size of a typical environmental proceed-
ing and the relatively small number of firms capable of handling this 
type of complex practice. 6 
In particular, settlement proceedings and litigation spawned by 
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund)7 have forced firms practicing 
environmental law to consider the ethical problems associated with 
multiple representations. 8 The very nature of Superfund proceedings 
has increased the likelihood that an attorney defending several po-
tentially responsible parties (PRPs) in the same proceeding will 
encounter conflicting or adverse interests among clients. Under 
CERCLA, any person who has contributed to the disposal of haz-
ardous substances can be held responsible, even if such contributions 
occurred decades before the initiation of a clean-up action. 9 Further-
5 Developments in the Law-Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L. REV. 
1244, 1247 (1981) [hereinafter Developmentsl. 
6 For instance, United States v. Conservation Chemical Co., 106 F.R.D. 210, 215 (W.D. 
Mo. 1985) involved the original defendants, 154 third-party defendants, 16 third-party insur-
ance company defendants, and 14 third-party federal agency defendants. The entire litigation 
involved over 250 defendants. See also United States v. Midwest Solvent Recovery Inc., 484 
F. Supp. 138 (N.D. Ind. 1980) (12 original defendants filed third-party complaints against 137 
other potentially responsible parties (PRPs»; 1985 HAZ. WASTE LIT. REP. 6972 (Andrews 
Publications) (Feb. 18, 1985). 
742 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
8 See infra notes 64-148 and accompanying text for a discussion of the effect Superfund has 
on attorney-client relationships. 
9 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) defines the parties that can be held liable 
under CERCLA. Although section 9607(a) does not explicitly state that CERCLA applies 
retroactively, several courts have canvassed the legislative history of the statute and have 
determined that it does apply retroactively to pre-CERCLA violators. See, e.g., United States 
v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chern. Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986); Ohio ex rei. 
Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300 (N.D. Ohio 1983). There are, however, three very 
narrow defenses available to targeted parties. These three defenses to liability under CER-
CLA are: an act of God, an act of war, or an act or omission of a third party other than an 
employee or agent of the defendant, or a contractor of the defendant. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b). 
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more, the number of PRPs can reach well into the hundreds when-
ever the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA or Agency)10 tar-
gets parties that may be liable for the clean-up costs of a large dump 
site. 11 When multiple PRPs are involved, a firm often finds itself 
representing several parties, all of whom are hoping to avoid liabil-
ity. 
This Comment addresses the difficulties encountered in applying 
present conflict standards, found in the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct (Model Rules),12 and the Model Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility (Model Code),13 to CERCLA's complex litigation and 
negotiation situations. This Comment then discusses the particular 
conflicts that arise in Superfund proceedings and illustrates how the 
ethical codes provide little, if any, substantive guidance toward re-
solving these complex issues. This situation has left the legal profes-
sion in a quandary over a basic question: whom can we represent? 
As this Comment illustrates, there are certain natural groupings of 
parties in Superfund proceedings that are benefited by multiple 
representation and can survive potential conflicts by virtue of the 
continuing relationships between them. 14 Where these relationships 
do not exist, however, counsel will face a conflict of interest in 
virtually every case. Finally, this Comment proposes methods by 
which attorneys can avoid potential conflicts before they occur, and 
argues that a different analysis of conflict issues should be applied 
to the multiple representation of parties involved in Superfund pro-
ceedings. 
10 42 U.S.C. § 9601(2) defines the "Administrator" of CERCLA as the Administrator of 
EPA. 
11 See supra note 3. 
12 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.7, 1.9 (1983) [hereinafter MODEL 
RULES]. 
13 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Disciplinary Rule (DR) 5-105 (1980) 
[hereinafter MODEL CODE]. 
14 CERCLA defines liable persons as: 
1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility, 
2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or 
operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of, 
3) any person who by contract, agreement or otherwise arranged for disposal or 
treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment 
4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to 
disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person, 
from which there is a release . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). See infra note 63 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion 
of liability under CERCLA. 
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II. THE MODEL RULES AND THE MODEL CODE 
When confronting the ethical issues that arise out of simultaneous 
mUltiple representations, the natural starting pojnt of the analysis 
is the Model Rules and the Model Code. Any such analysis must 
accommodate the existence of both the Model Code and the Model 
Rules, the latter having been adopted by the American Bar Asso-
ciation (ABA or the Bar) in 1983. Because not all states have adopted 
the Model Rules, however, many courts continue to use the Model 
Code when confronting ethical issues. 15 Nevertheless, the differences 
between the Model Rules and the Model Code with respect to ethical 
issues arising out of multiple representations are relatively minor. 16 
Consequently, this Comment will analyze the conflict standards 
enunciated in Model Rules 1.7 and 1.9, and will note briefly the 
changes the Model Rules have made to the Model Code. 
A. Model Rule 1.7 
Rule 1.7 provides the general rule governing all conflict-of-interest 
situations. 17 Subsection (a) of the Rule provides that a lawyer shall 
15 Many states apply their own ethical codes that govern the activities of attorneys practicing 
within their borders, but the language of these state statutes generally follows the two-
pronged test of the Model Rules and the Model Code. The subjective prong of the test requires 
a reasonable belief that representation of either client will not be materially limited and the 
objective prong requires informed consent. See MODEL RULES, supra note 12, Rule 1.7; 
MODEL CODE, supra note 13, DR 5-105. 
16 Both ethical provisions permit multiple representations under certain circumstances. In 
the Model Code, the objective test is that "it is obvious that [the lawyer] can adequately 
represent the interest of [both prospective clients]". MODEL CODE, supra note 13, DR 5-105. 
In the Model Rules, the standard is that "the lawyer reasonably believes the representation 
will not adversely affect the relationship with the other client." MODEL RULES, supra note 
12, Rule 1.7. Although a lawyer may "reasonably believe" that a conflict of interest has no 
damaging result upon representation of multiple parties without that representation meeting 
the "obviousness" standard of the Model Code, the difference is slight and has very little, if 
any, practical effect. See Commentary, Wheat v. United States, NAT'L RPTR. ON LEGAL 
ETHICS 97, 100 (1988). 
17 MODEL RULES, supra note 12, Rule 1. 7 provides: 
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client will be 
directly adverse to another client, unless: 
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely affect the 
relationship with the other client; and 
(2) each client consents after consultation. 
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be 
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third 
person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless: 
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely af-
fected; and 
(2) the client consents after consultation. When representation of multiple clients 
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not engage in mUltiple representations of clients whose interests 
directly conflict, unless he or she reasonably believes that the rep-
resentation will not be adversely affected, and each client consents 
to the representation. 18 This subsection establishes a strict rule 
against the representation of a second client when a conflict is known 
in advance,19 and requires withdrawal if the conflict is discovered 
after the concurrent representation has been undertaken. 20 Rule 
1. 7(a), however, applies only when the conflict "will" be direct and 
is not intended to bar the representation of clients with interests 
that "may" conflict.21 Rule 1. 7(b) applies when conflicts are only 
potential. 
Subsection (b) of Rule 1.7 is more flexible than Rule 1. 7(a). Its 
wording suggests that marginal limitations on the simultaneous rep-
resentation of mUltiple clients will not bar a lawyer's participation 
so long as the other parts of the Rule are satisfied. Rule 1. 7(b) bars 
the representation of a client if the representation will be "materially 
limited" by the lawyer's outside interests or responsibilities. 22 Be-
cause the Rule requires lawyers to consider the totality of their 
outside obligations, it has potential application at almost every junc-
ture of a multiple representation. 23 Nevertheless, subsection (b), like 
subsection (a), permits representation in conflict situations when the 
lawyer reasonably believes that the conflict is not insurmountable 
and each client provides informed consent. 
Rule 1. 7 clarifies the requirements needed to conduct mUltiple 
representations under Canon 5 of the Model Code and Disciplinary 
Rule 5-105(A) and (C).24 This clarification dictates that the client's 
informed consent must be independent of the lawyer's reasonable 
belief that the representation will not be adversely affected. 25 In 
fact, Rule 1. 7 expresses the same obligations developed in Canon 5 
and many of the Disciplinary Rules in terms of the effect outside 
responsibilities have on the quality of a lawyer's representation. 26 
Id. 
in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall include explanation of the 
implications of the common representation and the advantages and risks involved. 
18 Id., Rule 1.7(a). 
19 HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES, supra note 3, at 129. 
2°Id. 
21 Id. at 131. 
22 MODEL RULES, supra note 12, Rule 1. 7(b). 
23 HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES, supra note 3, at 141. 
24 SELECTED STATUTES, RULES AND STAKDARDS ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION 138-39 (West 
1987) [hereinafter SELECTED STATUTES]. 
25Id. 
26 HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES, supra note 3, at 140.2. 
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When an attorney is considering the viability of a simultaneous 
multiple representation, the language of Rule 1. 7 raises a number 
of questions of interpretation. For instance, the Model Rules do not 
make it clear when it is "reasonable" for an attorney to believe that 
a mUltiple representation is permissible. Similarly, the Rules provide 
little guidance in determining when a mUltiple representation be-
comes "adversely affected," or how an attorney can achieve a "fully 
informed consent." 
1. Reasonable Belief 
Lawyers undertaking multiple representations are responsible for 
resolving conflicts of interest whether these conflicts are actual or 
potential. When it is determined that the interests of two or more 
clients actually conflict, a lawyer can engage in mUltiple represen-
tation only upon his or her reasonable belief that the representation 
of anyone client will not be materially affected. 
When conflicts are only potential, the determination of a real 
conflict depends upon the specific facts and circumstances of each 
case.27 Unfortunately, the Model Rules do not articulate a test for 
determining an "adverse effect." The comments to Rule 1. 7 clarify 
the test by defining an adverse effect as an impairment of loyalty 
that occurs "when a lawyer cannot consider, recommend or carry 
out an appropriate course of action for the client because of the 
lawyer's other responsibilities or interests. "28 Thus, courts may dis-
qualify counsel if it is not obvious that mUltiple representation will 
be adequate or proper.29 Similarly, the comments articulate a re-
striction upon an attorney's representation of multiple parties in a 
negotiation in which the interests of the parties are "fundamentally 
antagonistic to each other. "30 When a common defense can be as-
serted or the parties' interests are generally aligned, however, com-
mon representation is permissible. 31 
27 See Figueroa-Olmo v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 616 F. Supp. 1445 (D.P.R. 1985). 
[Wlhere the possible conflict arises within the context of an ongoing proceeding in 
which the parties' rights are yet to be established, the shaping of the conflict's profile 
will necessarily turn on the legal and strategical feasibility of the claims or defenses 
that, if raised, will create the actual adverse position .... 
[d. at 1452. 
28 MODEL RULES, supra note 12, Rule 1. 7(b) comment. This comment provides additional 
guidance in defining a conflict of interest, a definition noticeably lacking in the Model Code. 
29 See Figueroa-Olmo, 616 F. Supp. at 1451-52; Unified Sewerage Agency v. Jelco Inc., 646 
F.2d 1339, 1346-47 (9th Cir. 1981). 
30 MODEL RULES, supra note 12, Rule 1. 7 comment. 
3! [d. 
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Regardless of whether a conflict is potential or actual, if an attor-
ney reasonably believes that the conflicting interests will not ad-
versely affect representation, the clients are free to consent to the 
representation, notwithstanding the conflict.32 By permitting such 
consent, Rule 1. 7 shifts some of the inquiry into the propriety of a 
multiple representation away from the attorney's judgment and 
gives the client the ultimate decision. Requiring both the lawyer's 
reasonable belief and the client's voluntary consent (based upon full 
disclosure) helps avoid the potential pitfalls of multiple representa-
tions and retains its benefits (such as shared legal expenses and a 
united defense).33 Courts, however, are not always convinced that 
an actual or potential conflict is resolved simply by a client's consent 
to multiple representation. 34 As a result, courts often interpret the 
disclosure requirement strictly. 
2. Disclosure and Consent 
Although parties are free to waive the right to disqualify counsel 
for conflicts of interest,35 a waiver does not absolve a lawyer com-
pletely from his or her ethical responsibilities. An attorney's request 
for a conflict waiver from a client must be accompanied by a full 
disclosure of all facts and circumstances relevant to the conflict, 
including the possibility and desirability of seeking independent legal 
advice. 36 Therefore, in order to obtain a valid waiver, an attorney 
cannot merely inform the client that the attorney intends to repre-
sent multiple parties. Rather, the attorney must inform each client 
of all relevant facts and circumstances. One method of ensuring a 
party's informed consent is to advise clients to consult separate 
counsel before consenting. 37 
When informed consent is obtained, courts generally are reluctant 
to second-guess both the client and the attorney by disqualifying 
32 Cf, id. ("[W]hen a disinterested lawyer would conclude that the client should not agree 
to the representation under the circumstances, the lawyer involved cannot properly ask for 
[consent] or provide representation on the basis of the client's consent."). 
33 See infra notes 184-85 and accompanying text. 
34 See, e.g., Schenck v. Hill, Lent & Troescher, 530 N.Y.S.2d 486, 140 Misc. 2d 288 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1988) (a law firm's conflict of interest with clients in a legal malpractice action 
required disqualification because the consent did not reflect a full understanding of the legal 
rights being waived). 
35 MODEL RULES, supra note 12, Rule 1. 7(a)(2), (b)(2) and comment. 
36 Civil Servo Comm'n V. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 159, 168, 163 Cal. App. 3d 70, 82 
(1984). 
37 Developments, supra note 5, at 1313. 
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counsel due to a potential or actual conflict.38 This reluctance, how-
ever, will not prevent a court from disqualifying counsel when per-
tinent information relating to a conflict has not been disclosed. 39 
Moreover, if, in the eyes of a court, an attorney cannot reasonably 
believe that he or she can represent both parties adequately, the 
attorney is subject to disqualification under Rule 1. 7, notwithstand-
ing the client's consent. 40 
B. Model Rule 1.9 
While Rule 1. 7 addresses the conflicts that arise during the si-
multaneous representation of current clients, Rule 1.9 addresses 
conflicts that can harm former clients. Despite the differences be-
tween Rule 1.9 and Rule 1.7, the basic analytical approach of both 
Rules is the same and the client interests at stake are similar. For 
example, the design and effect of Rule 1.9, like that of Rule 1.7, 
ensure that both present and former clients have a limited form of 
veto power over their lawyer's choice of clients. 41 
Rule 1. 9 prohibits the representation of a client who has materially 
adverse interests with a former client in the same or substantially 
related matter unless the former client consents. 42 Furthermore, 
Rule 1.9(b) prevents an attorney from using information about a 
former client to that client's detriment. 43 Rule 1.9 also incorporates 
the duty to avoid "the appearance of impropriety" as expressed by 
Canon 9 of the Model Code, and forbids multiple representations 
when the possibility exists that a former client's confidences will be 
38 [d. at 1308; see also Unified Sewerage Agency v. Jelco Inc., 646 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1981) 
(client who was fully advised that some detriment could result from his hiring a particular 
attorney was allowed to choose to take a calculated risk). 
39 Developments, supra note 5, at 1310-11. 
40 See, e.g., Schenck v. Hill, Lent & Troescher, 530 N.Y.S.2d 486, 140 Misc. 2d 288 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1988). 
41 HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES, supra note 3, at 175. 
42 MODEL RULES, supra note 12, Rule 1.9. Rule 1.9 provides: 
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter: 
(a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which 
that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client 
unless the former client consents after consultation; or 
(b) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the former 
client except as Rule 1.6 or Rule 3.3 would permit or require with respect to a client 
or when the information has become generally known. 
[d. The Rule directs the reader to consult Rule 1.6, regarding the use of confidential infor-
mation, and Rule 3.3, regarding candor toward the tribunal. The issues involved in these two 
exceptions are generally outside the scope of this Comment. 
43 [d. 
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used to the current client's advantage. 44 Despite Rule 1.9's prohibi-
tions, its comments allow the representation of a new client with 
adverse interests in a similar matter so long as the representation 
involves a wholly distinct problem. 45 Consequently, a firm may be 
permitted to represent a party without obtaining the former client's 
consent if the current proceeding does not implicate the same issues 
or problems involved in the former representation. Nevertheless, 
by virtue of Rule 1.9's incorporation of Canon 9, a firm may be 
obligated to refuse representation of a new client in order to preserve 
the appearance of professional propriety. 46 
Under Canon 9 of the Model Code, an attorney must avoid the 
appearance of professional impropriety.47 This canon restricts con-
duct that, while not in violation of other canons, may lead laypersons 
to believe that their interests are adversely affected. 48 Consequently, 
multiple representations may not be permitted when the circum-
stances of a particular case involve delicate conflicting relationships 
and inescapably divided loyalties. Thus, the mere likelihood of im-
proper conduct or motivation, even without a showing of harm and 
regardless of disclosure or consent, may give the appearance of 
professional misconduct and warrant withdrawal. 49 
Regardless of a client's informed consent, and notwithstanding 
judicial reluctance to overturn such consent, courts will inquire 
whether a conflict waiver can "cure the damage to the integrity of 
the judicial process that, such joint representation [would] cause."50 
Thus, even if an attorney obtains a client's informed consent, and 
the attorney reasonably believes that his or her representation will 
not be materially impaired, a court may find that the representation 
44 SELECTED STATUTES, supra note 24, at 144; see also Haagen-Dazs Inc. v. Perche No! 
Gelato, Inc., 639 F. Supp. 282 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (plaintiff's counsel disqualified in an antitrust 
matter because one of its attorneys formerly worked as in-house counsel for the defendant, 
despite the fact that the attorney was not involved in the current dispute). 
45 MODEL RULES, supra note 12, Rule 1.9 comment. "[A] lawyer who recurrently handled 
a type of problem for a former client is not precluded from later representing another client 
in a wholly distinct problem of that type even though the subsequent representation involves 
a position adverse to the prior client." Id. 
46 But see infra note 166 and accompanying text (discussing Canon 9's treatment at the 
Circuit level). 
47 Canon 9 provides that "[a] lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional 
impropriety." MODEL CODE, supra note 13, Canon 9. 
48 See In re Eastern Sugar Antitrust Litig., 697 F.2d 524, 530 (3d Cir. 1982) (attorneys 
must meet their general obligation to maintain public confidence in the integrity of the Bar). 
49 Schenck v. Hill, Lent & Troescher, 530 N.Y.S.2d 486, 487, 140 Misc. 2d 288,290 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1988). 
50 Figueroa-Olmo v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 616 F. Supp. 1445, 1451 (D.P.R. 1985). 
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gives such a strong appearance of professional impropriety that 
disqualification is in order. 51 
In any large and complex proceeding, a law firm's legal relation-
ship with a client may be such that dual or joint representation of 
other parties in the same matter would give an appearance of im-
propriety. Under these circumstances, courts may view a client's 
conflict waiver as insufficient. 52 Due to the complexity and size of a 
typical Superfund proceeding, attorneys agreeing to undertake the 
mUltiple representation of PRPs must consider carefully all of the 
past and present interests that may be involved, even those interests 
that appear to be outside the scope of the instant litigation. 53 
Despite this mUltiplicity of legal standards, and hypothetical rep-
resentations that are the basis of both ethical codes, three objectives 
survive the sometimes vague and abstract language of the rules. 54 
These objectives include: the need to protect a client's legitimate 
interests; the need for capable and professional counsel; and finally, 
the Bar's need to be regarded by the public as trustworthy and 
just. 55 When attempting to apply these objectives to CERCLA lia-
bility and allocations, it becomes clear that the practitioner lacks the 
proper guidance to feel completely comfortable representing multiple 
parties in such cases. In fact, conflicts in Superfund proceedings may 
be the most difficult to resolve due to the magnitude of the 
proceeding56 and the latency of a party's potential liability. 57 Multiple 
representations in Superfund proceedings can be appropriate in cer-
tain situations, but counsel must be aware of the potential conflicts 
that may arise in virtually every case. 
III. THE SUPERFUND PROCESS 
The process established by CERCLA and employed by EPA to 
assess clean-up liability, settle or litigate clean-up costs creates a 
variety of potential conflicts of interest for law firms defending mul-
51 See W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. International Medical Prosthetics Research Assocs., 745 F.2d 
1463 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (law firm disqualified because two of its members had previously 
represented the plaintiff against the defendants). 
52 Schenck, 530 N. Y.S.2d at 487, 140 Misc. 2d at 290. 
53 For instance, a firm that engages in a diverse environmental practice may currently 
represent a PRP that eventually seeks contribution from another client that has not yet been 
targeted as a responsible party by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA or Agency). 
54 See L. GILBERT & G. ZADOROZNY, SERVING Two MASTERS: THE LAW OF DISQUALIFI-
CATION 3 (1984). 
55Id. 
56 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
57 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
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tiple parties. The standards of liability established in section 107 of 
CERCLA58 and the application of joint and several liability59 can 
discourage defendants from presenting a common defense and invite 
cross-claims between these parties in an effort to limit liability. 60 
Furthermore, an analysis of EPA's settlement policy illustrates how 
the prospect of bearing a disproportionate share of clean-up costs 
through failure to settle intensifies co-defendants' adversity.61 Fi-
nally, an examination of these settlement pressures reveals how 
firms are often placed on a collision course with very serious conflicts 
of interest when individual PRPs pursue contribution claims. 62 
A. Determining Liability and the Notification Process Under 
CERCLA 
Section 107 of CERCLA establishes the classes of parties that are 
potentially liable for the costs of cleaning up hazardous waste sites. 63 
58 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
59 Originally, CERCLA did not prescribe joint and several liability. Since the enactment of 
the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA), however, federal courts have 
construed the statute as imposing joint and several liability. See infra notes 75-79 and 
accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of joint and several liability under CERCLA. 
60 See infra notes 93-103 and accompanying text. 
61 See infra notes 104-48 and accompanying text. 
62 See infra notes 124-28 and accompanying text. 
63 Section 107 of CERCLA provides: 
(1) The owner and operator of a vessel or a facility, 
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or 
operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of, 
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or 
treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, 
or for disposal or treatment of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such 
person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or 
operated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances, and 
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to 
disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person, 
from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the occurrence 
of response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for-
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Govern-
ment or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national contingency 
plan; 
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent 
with the national contingency plan; 
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including 
the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such 
release; 
(D) The costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried out under 
section 9604(i) of this title. 
42 U.S.C § 9607(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
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This liability provision creates four basic categories of PRPS.64 The 
first category includes persons65 presently owning or operating a 
polluting facility.66 The second includes persons owning,or operating 
a polluting facility at the time of disposal. 67 The tl).ird targets persons 
arranging for the disposal, treatment, or transport of waste. 68 The 
fourth imposes liability on persons accepting waste for transport to 
disposal or treatment facilities. 69 These parties are held strictly liable 
for clean-up costs. 70 Once there is sufficient evidence available to 
make a preliminary determination of potential liability under section 
107, EPA begins its notification process. 71 
This notification process starts with a "general notice letter" to 
each PRP. The letter contains notification of potential liability for 
response costs, a discussion about future notices, a general discus-
sion about site activities, a request for information about the site, 
the release of certain site-specific information, and a deadline for the 
PRP's response to the letter.72 The general notice informs each PRP 
of the names and addresses of other PRPs who have received the 
letter, and, to the extent that such information is available, the 
volume and nature of substances found at the site, and a ranking by 
64 Id. 
65 I d. § 9601(21). "Person" is defined broadly as: "an individual, firm, corporation, association, 
partnership, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States Government, State, 
municipality ... or any interstate body." Id. 
66 I d. § 9607(a). 
67Id. 
68 Id. 
69Id. 
70 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) defines liability under CERCLA as strict 
by reference to section 311 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) (codified at 
33 U.S.C. § 1321(c) (1982». Courts have determined that section 311 provides for strict 
liability. See Note, A Right of Contribution Under CERCLA: The Case for Federal Common 
Law, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 668, 669-70 n.8 (1986), for a brief discussion of judicial application 
of FWPCA section 311 and CERCLA's legislative history, which reveals an intent to impose 
a strict liability standard in Superfund proceedings. See also United States v. Bliss, 667 F. 
Supp. 1298 (E.D. Mo. 1987) (liability under CERCLA held to be strict, without regard to 
liable parties' fault or state of mind); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and 
Chern. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (defendants being sought by EPA for response 
costs were subject to strict liability); United States v. Conservation Chern. Co., 589 F. Supp. 
59 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (strict liability is more consistent with the legislative aims of CERCLA, 
which include goals such as the spreading of costs and the assurance that responsible parties 
bear the cost of cleanup). 
71 EPA Interim Guidance on Notice Letters, Negotiations and Information Exchange, 53 
Fed. Reg. 5298, 5301 (1988). The Guidance provides that PRPs should inform EPA of sub-
stances sent to or present at the site and the name of other PRPs, pursuant to section 104(e) 
of CERCLA. Id. at 5302. 
72Id. at 5301. 
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volume of the substances contributed by each PRP.73 Receipt of a 
general notice triggers a period of informal negotiations between 
PRPs and EPA.74 Generally, PRPs have thirty days to respond to 
the Agency's information request. 75 
The next step in the notification process is the issuance of a "special 
notice letter" to each PRP.76 Issuance of this letter is discretionary 
and depends upon whether EPA believes that a period of formal 
negotiations will facilitate a settlement agreement and expedite re-
medial actions. 77 Thus, the Agency may begin expending Superfund 
monies immediately toward remedial action if it believes that the 
PRPs have not been negotiating in good faith, or if it believes that 
settlement is unlikely. 78 
Issuance of a special notice letter is important to PRPs because 
this letter triggers a moratorium during which EPA will not conduct 
a remedial investigation/feasibility study (RIIFS) of its own, but will 
allow PRPs to conduct their own remedial actions. 79 The period of 
formal negotiations triggered by the special notice letter lasts sixty 
days from the day the PRP receives the letter.80 If EPA receives a 
good faith offer within that period, it will not commence actions 
against any person for liability for an additional sixty days.81 If 
information relating to the volume of substances found at the clean-
up site was not available when the general notice was issued, such 
73 I d. at 5302. 
74 I d. at 5300. 
75 Id. at 5302. 
76 Section 122(e) of CERCLA contains provisions relating to the special notice procedures 
and the release of information to PRPs. The third and final step in the notification process 
involves the issuance of a remedial design/remedial action (RD/RA) special notice letter as 
provided in section 122(e) of CERCLA. The content of the remedial investigation/feasibility 
study (RIIFS) is very similar to the RD/RA special notice letter. Therefore, this Comment 
analyzes both letters in the context of the special notice procedure. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(e) (1982 
& Supp. IV 1986). 
77 EPA Interim Guidance on Notice Letters, Negotiations and Information Exchange, 53 
Fed. Reg. 5298, 5302 (1988). The Guidance provides that EPA may determine that it is 
inappropriate to issue a special notice and begin remedial actions itself where, inter alia, past 
dealings with the PRPs indicate that they are unlikely to negotiate settlement, or where the 
Agency believes that the PRPs lack the resources to conduct response activities. Id. Section 
122(a) grants EPA the authority to decide not to use the special notice procedures established 
under section 122(e). EPA is required to notify PRPs of this decision and explain why it is 
inappropriate to use such procedures. This decision is not subject to judicial review. 42 U. S. C. 
§ 9622(a). 
78 53 Fed. Reg. 5298, 5299 (1988). 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 The Agency will not pursue section 104 or 106 actions and will not commence an RIIFS 
during this time period. Id. 
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information and a ranking, by volume, of each substance is provided 
in the special notice, or as soon as this information becomes avail-
able. 82 
Therefore, under CERCLA, EPA targets and notifies a diverse 
group of PRPs, each informed of its own potential liability relative 
to the potential liability of other PRPs. The fundamental goal of this 
notification process, and CERCLA's enforcement program in gen-
eral, is to facilitate settlements.83 The practical effect, however, 
pressures PRPs to negotiate "in good faith" toward settlement, or 
face the disquieting prospect of litigating response costs against the 
EPA or other PRPS.84 
On paper, EPA's notification process appears completely fair and 
equitable. In practice, however, the Agency may not always be so 
accommodating to the particular problems facing PRPs. For in-
stance, EPA often refuses to release vital volumetric data until after 
PRPs have answered informational requests, a point in time that 
necessarily arrives after the general notice letter has been issued.85 
Moreover, PRPs are given a relatively short time frame in which to 
inform the government of their willingness to negotiate. It is within 
this time constraint that each PRP must decide if it wishes to retain 
joint counsel and assert a common defense. 86 If joint counsel is 
retained, PRPs must also decide how the group intends to address 
potential conflict-of-interest issues. This pressure is intensified by 
the fact that a PRP that refuses to settle may be liable for the total 
clean-up costs if a court finds it jointly and severally liable. 87 
B. Judicial Application of Joint and Several Liability and 
Contribution 
Originally, CERCLA did not prescribe a method for allocating 
liability when multiple parties were deemed responsible for a release 
82 I d. at 5305. 
83 I d. at 5298. 
84 See infra notes 93-148 and accompanying text. 
85 This information about the realities of the notification process was obtained through 
conversations with practitioners dealing in Superfund negotiations and litigations. At the 
interviewees' request, their names are not cited. 
86 Section 107(b) provides that a PRP will not be liable if it can establish that the release 
and resulting damage were caused solely by: "(1) an act of God; (2) an act of war; or (3) an 
act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent of the defendant .... " 42 
U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
87 See infra notes 88-98 and accompanying text. 
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of hazardous substances. 88 The judiciary, however, consistently ap-
plied joint and several liability to CERCLA cases despite the chem-
ical industry's plea for apportioned liability and Congress's exclusion 
of a joint and several liability provision in the statute. 89 Courts 
reasoned that Congress intended flexible common law principles of 
liability allocation to apply in Superfund proceedings.90 Additional 
support for the imposition of joint and several liability in Superfund 
cases stems from the fact that hazardous waste problems have a 
national significance and implicate federal interests, thereby calling 
for the application of federal common law. 91 Therefore, the federal 
common law of joint and several liability applies, and the burden of 
proving that damages are divisible and capable of apportionment 
falls upon the defendant. 92 
In an effort to ameliorate the harsh result of joint and several 
liability, PRPs raise the right of contribution existing under common 
law and provided for in several provisions of CERCLA.93 When 
multiple parties are deemed liable for clean-up costs, CERCLA is 
not intended to make one party bear the full costs of removing 
hazardous substances. 94 A responsible party bearing a dispropor-
tionate share of clean-up costs commonly seeks recovery from other 
PRPs in two situations. The first situation occurs when a party 
voluntarily cleans up a site prior to governmental action and seeks 
88 See generally Note, supra note 70 (discussing the imposition of joint and several liability 
in CERCLA cases). 
89 Jd.; see also United States v. Conservation Chern. Co., 589 F. Supp. 59 (W.D. Mo. 1984) 
(joint and several liability imposed on CERCLA violators); United States v. Northeastern 
Pharmaceutical & Chern. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (joint and several liability 
imposed for CERCLA violations); United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249 
(S.D. Ill. 1984) (joint and several liability imposed for CERCLA violations). 
00 A & F Materials, 578 F. Supp. at 1255-56; United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 
1338-39 (E.D. Pa. 1983); see also W. FREEDMAN, HAZARDOUS WASTE LIABILITY 604-05 
(1987). 
91 United States v. Chern-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 808-09 (S.D. Ohio 1983); A & F 
Materials, 578 F. Supp. at 1255. 
92 See Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. at 809-10; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B 
(1976). 
93 See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (CERCLA contribution provision). See, 
e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chern. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1142-43 (E.D. Pa. 1982) 
(city allowed to recover response costs from responsible generators). 
94 See SARA, section 113(0: 
Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or potentially 
liable under section 9607(a) .... [IJn resolving contribution claims, the court may 
allocate response costs among liable parties using such equitable factors as the court 
determines are appropriate. 
42 U.S.C. § 9613(f). 
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recovery under CERCLA section 107(a)(4)(B).95 The second situation 
occurs when a party is targeted as a PRP and attempts to limit its 
potential liability by impleading and cross-claiming other parties 
under CERCLA section 113(f).96 This latter section provides that 
allocation should be determined by the use of equitable factors that 
the court determines are appropriate. 97 Courts have held, however, 
that, when a party seeks to limit liability on the ground that the 
entire harm is capable of apportionment, that party must demon-
strate the feasibility of apportionment. 98 
Apportioning damages among PRPs can be extremely difficult 
when liability is imposed upon a large group of defendants. In United 
States v. A & F Materials CO.,99 the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of Illinois identified several factors relevant 
to apportionment of damages among four generator defendants who 
released hazardous substances at an Illinois disposal site. The factors 
included: (1) a party's ability to demonstrate that its contribution to 
a discharge, release, or disposal of a hazardous waste can be distin-
guished from the contributions of other defendants; (2) the amount 
of the hazardous waste involved; (3) the degree of toxicity of the 
waste involved; (4) the degree of involvement by the party in the 
generation, transportation, treatment, storage, or disposal of the 
hazardous waste; (5) the degree of care a party exercised with re-
spect to the hazardous waste involved; and (6) the degree of coop-
eration by a party with federal, state, or local officials. 1OO Thus, a 
defendant who demonstrates, pursuant to the A & F Materials test, 
that the greater share of liability belongs to other parties, can reduce 
its share of clean-up costs and shift those costs to its co-defendants. 101 
95 Section 107(a)(4)(B) provides that defendants are also liable for response costs and dam-
ages "incurred by any other person consistent with the national contingency plan." 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9607(a)(4)(B). Section 9607(j) also preserves pre-existing common law rights. [d. § 9607(j). 
96 J. Homsy & M. Sargis, The Scope of Private Cost-Recovery Actions Under CERCLA 
Section 107(a)(4)(B), and Allocation Among Potentially Responsible Parties, in HAZARDOUS 
WASTE LITIGATION 1988 33, 35 (1988). 
97 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0. 
98 United States v. Conservation Chern. Co., 589 F. Supp. 59, 63 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (past off-
site generators of hazardous wastes held not to have met their burden of proving apportion-
ment); United States v. Chern-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 808-09 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (court 
relied on the principle espoused in the Restatement (Second) of Torts that divisibility properly 
becomes the responsibility of the party seeking to avoid or limit its liability on the ground 
that the entire harm is capable of apportionment); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 443B (1976). 
99 578 F. Supp. 1249 (S.D. Ill. 1984). 
100 [d. at 1256. Several of the court's criteria are rooted in negligence standards, even though 
CERCLA mandates strict liability. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
101 CERCLA section 113(0(2) provides that "settlement ... reduces the potential liability 
-- ----------
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Given the enormous potential burden of joint and several liability, 
parties litigating clean-up liability under CERCLA invariably argue 
for apportionment. Claiming that damages should be apportioned, 
however, can create a conflict of interest when parties retaining joint 
counsel attempt to separate themselves from their co-defendants. 
For instance, transporters and de minimis generators often distance 
themselves from the liability that faces large-volume generators and 
generators of different hazardous substances. 102 Once a court allows 
a party to prove apportionment, it seems clear that the interests 
among individual defendants become adverse. 
Because apportionment involves issues that are not always re-
solved by a neutral, empirical inquiry, the defendants involved in 
mUltiple representations may find themselves disputing each other's 
relative culpability. If a mUltiple representation involves clients from 
different classes of defendants, such as transporters and treaters, 
this type of conflict seems more likely to occur.103 These problems 
surrounding the process of apportioning remedial costs among mul-
tiple parties can also disrupt settlement negotiations between PRPs 
and EPA. 
C. How EPA's Settlement Policies Engender Conflicts 
Like the potential imposition of joint and several liability on CER-
CLA co-defendants, EPA's settlement policies, as set forth in the 
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA),104 in-
crease the likelihood that parties will become polarized during ne-
gotiations. Cleanup of hazardous waste sites can be accomplished by 
PRPs before or during settlement negotiations. 105 These private 
party cleanups generally are more widespread than government-
funded cleanups.106 CERCLA's recognition of private cost-recovery 
actions can engender conflicts of interest when the PRP that has 
of others by the amount of the settlement." 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
Thus, the costs allocated to one defendant will affect the costs allocated to co-defendants. 
102 Section 122(g) of CERCLA expressly authorizes de minimis settlements. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9622(g); see Borland, Issues Faced in Organizing the Defense in HAZARDOUS WASTE LITI-
GATION AFTER THE RCRA AND CERCLA AMENDMENTS 1987 149, 152 (1987) (author rec-
ognizes contribution claims between a group of PRPs retaining joint counsel as a potential 
conflict-of-interest problem that should be addressed before joint counsel is retained). 
103 See infra notes 185-86 and accompanying text. 
104 Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified as amending CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 9601-9675 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986». 
105 See 42 U.S.C. 9613(0 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
106 See J. Homsy & M. Sargis, supra note 96, at 35. 
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undertaken response measures is represented by the same counsel 
retained by other PRPS.107 
Additionally, the Agency's use of new settlement negotiation tools 
can complicate relations between multiple PRPs, and can make it 
more likely that the various interests of these parties will become 
adverse. For example, the use of contribution protection,108 non-
binding allocations of responsibility (NBARs),109 de minimis contri-
bution settlements,110 and mixed fundinglll can polarize PRPs, par-
ticularly if a relatively small group of PRPs refuses to agree to a 
settlement proposal. 112 A closer examination of how these tools affect 
the interests of individual PRPs illustrates how easily conflicts of 
interest arise during multiple representation of parties negotiating 
a settlement of response costs under CERCLA. 
1. Private Cost-Recovery Actions 
Settlement does not always involve EPA beyond an initial iden-
tification of PRPS.113 In order to expedite the response process, 
CERCLA permits a PRP to begin clean-up measures and then seek 
contribution from other PRPs. 114 Private party response actions pro-
mote expeditious cleanup of hazardous waste sites by allowing the 
party that provided response measures to recover the share of costs 
that is not its own. 115 Section 113 of CERCLA permits any party 
107 See infra notes 114-19 and accompanying text. 
108 See infra notes 120-26 and accompanying text. 
109 See infra notes 127-39 and accompanying text. 
110 See infra notes 140-42 and accompanying text. 
111 See infra notes 143-48 and accompanying text. 
112 Mays, Settlements with SARA: A Comprehensive Review of Settlement Procedures Under 
the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act, in HAZARDOUS WASTE LITIGATION 
AFTER THE RCRA AND CERCLA AMENDMENTS 1987 229 (1987). Mays discusses these tools 
in detail. Mixed funding is described as a method of funding site cleanup by using a combination 
of Superfund and PRP funds as authorized by SARA. 42 U.S.C. § 122(b)(I) (1982 & Supp. 
IV 1986). Nonbinding allocations of responsibility (NBARs) are an optional method of allocat-
ing responsibility among PRPs according to the RIfFS conducted by the Agency. As the name 
suggests, these initial allocation findings are not binding and essentially provide preliminary 
guidelines for allocating response costs. NBARs have considerable influence, however, on a 
large group of PRPs. De minimis settlements allow PRPs who have contributed minor 
amounts of waste to a site to settle early in the process. [d. 
113 J. Homsy & M. Sargis, supra note 96, at 33 (PRPs can resolve clean-up costs among 
themselves when voluntary cleanup has been completed). 
114 [d.; 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(4)(B), 9613(0 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Private cost-recovery 
actions are recognized in CERCLA section 113(0. For an example of such an action, see 
Chemical Waste Mgmt. v. Armstrong World Indus., 669 F. Supp. 1285, 1292 (E.D. Pa. 1987) 
("[A] PRP may recover response costs from another PRP."). 
115 See J. Homsy & M. Sargis, supra note 96, at 36. 
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that has paid or agreed to pay response costs to seek contribution 
from any person who may be liable under the statute. 116 In general, 
contribution claims can seriously endanger the viability of mUltiple 
representations of PRPs. Prior governmental approval of private 
party clean-up actions is not a prerequisite to cost recovery.117 Sim-
ilarly, prior notification to other PRPs that response measures are 
being undertaken is not required. 11s Thus, PRPs may be forced to 
pay for clean-up costs before a formal negotiation period has begun 
or before assessing appropriate allocation proposals. 
This lack of notification can create a conflict of interest when joint 
counsel is retained by both the party undertaking response measures 
and other PRPs. Generators are most likely to initiate voluntary 
cleanup, because these parties generally have the resources needed 
to conduct response measures and can pursue other PRPs for reim-
bursement of those costs that are not their own. 119 Therefore, the 
mUltiple representation of a varied class of PRPs is more likely to 
fall prey to a conflict problem when response costs are sought. The 
use of contribution protection does not resolve the ethical problems 
these claims pose to the attorney undertaking such a representation. 
2. Contribution Protection 
The possibility that a PRP may be granted contribution protection 
once it has settled its liability with EPA can strain the relationships 
between PRPs during settlement negotiations, and may create con-
flicts of interest if contribution actions are pursued after settlement. 
Under CERCLA sections 113(f), 122(g)(5), and 122(h)(4), a PRP 
that "has resolved its liability" with the government in an adminis-
trative or jugicial settlement is not liable for contribution claims 
involving matters addressed in that particular settlement. 120 N on-
116 See id. at 40. 
11742 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1). 
118 [d. § 9613(g)(2). Private actions for cost recovery can be commenced at any time after 
response costs have been incurred, subject to the temporal limitations set forth in subpara-
graph (g). [d. 
119 See Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 823 F.2d 977, 981 (6th Cir. 1987) (in light of 
CERCLA's purpose, language and structure, in addition to its legislative history, notification 
is not required in private actions for the recovery of response costs). 
120 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9613(f)(2), 9622(g)(5), 9622(h)(4). The concept of providing contribution 
protection to a party who has entered into an administrative settlement agreement raises 
constitutional questions. Whether or not barring a party's right to contribution violates due 
process was addressed by Senator Stafford in a speech delivered on the Senate floor. See 132 
CONGo REe. S14,904-05 (1986). The issues surrounding this question are beyond the scope of 
this Comment. 
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settling parties are not released by the settlement, but their poten-
tial liability is reduced by the settlement amount. 121 This policy 
implies that a nonsettling PRP must make its views known during 
settlement negotiations if it believes the settling parties are getting 
a "sweetheart deal" by paying less than their equitable share of the 
clean-up costS. 122 If such a settlement occurs, either the nonsettling 
parties or the Fund has to cover the full amount left by a party that 
settles for less than its equitable share. 123 
The likelihood that parties will cross-claim for contribution is pres-
ent even after a settlement agreement has been reached. By simul-
taneously providing contribution protection to settling PRPs, and 
authorizing PRPs, in general, to seek contribution from any liable 
party, CERCLA opens an avenue to settled PRPs to pursue claims 
against nonsettling parties. 124 Furthermore, it is possible that a PRP 
who has settled with EPA can pursue another settling party if the 
latter settlement does not address those issues that are the basis of 
the contribution action. 125 Because all contribution actions under 
CERCLA are governed by federal law, 126 there is also some question 
as to whether a settled party is subject to contribution claims arising 
under state statutes or state common law. 
There is thus no clear answer as to how CERCLA's contribution 
protection clause is to be construed in light of the provision granting 
parties the right to contribution. Although attentive and creative 
draftsmanship of settlement agreements can remove a client's sus-
ceptibility to contribution claims, a serious conflict of interest may 
still exist if a settled PRP seeks contribution from a non settled PRP 
who retained the same counsel during negotiations. Furthermore, 
settlement negotiating tools utilized by EPA during its formal ne-
gotiation process can create this situation before a settlement is ever 
reached. 
12142 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2). 
122 See Light, SARA's Consequences: The Emerging Legal Debate Over Liability, Contri-
bution and Administrative Law, in HAZARDOUS WASTE LITIGATION AFTER THE RCRA AND 
CERCLA AMENDMENTS 1987 68-69 (1987). Light suggests that the government, not the 
nonsettling PRPs, should bear the portion of the clean-up costs not covered by a "sweetheart" 
settlement. In this situation, the potential liability of the nonsettling parties would be reduced 
by the settled PRP's equitable share, rather than the underestimated share. [d. 
123 [d. 
124 Mays, supra note 112, at 258; see also 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(5) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
125 See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Settled parties are protected from 
contribution "regarding those matters addressed in the settlement." [d. 
126 [d. § 9613(f)(3)(C). 
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3. EPA's Use of NBARs, De Minimis Settlements and Mixed 
Funding 
391 
A nonbinding allocation of responsibility (NBAR) is an optional 
tool that EPA utilizes to establish preliminary guidelines for alloca-
tion. 127 In essence, it provides a comprehensive analysis for the 
settlement of liability for hazardous wastes found at a clean-up 
site. 128 NBARs can help a PRP class by providing an objective 
analysis of each party's potential liability, including the allocation of 
clean-up responsibility as set out in the remedial investigation/fea-
sibility study (RIIFS).129 Conversely, NBARs can present a tremen-
dous obstacle to an attorney who represents several PRPs when one 
party within the mUltiple representation disagrees with EPA's al-
location. 
In May of 1987 , EPA issued its "Interim Guidelines for Preparing 
Nonbinding Allocations of Responsibility."13o The factors established 
in the Guidelines closely resemble the A & F Materials court's list 
of factors relevant to apportionment of damages. 131 The Guidelines' 
factors include: the volume, toxicity, and mobility of wastes; the 
strength of evidence against a PRP; the ability of a PRP to pay; the 
litigation risks and public interest considerations; the precedential 
value of a case if it were litigated; and other potentially aggravating 
factors in a case if it were to proceed to trial. 132 If, for example, the 
factual circumstances in a case overwhelmingly favor the govern-
ment, EPA might seek to enforce the NBAR in order to develop a 
favorable precedent for future CERCLA actions. 
An NBAR is solely advisory.133 Consequently, it is not admissible 
in any proceeding, nor can it be reviewed by a court.134 Regardless 
of how fair an NBAR may appear, the effect it has on a PRP's 
negotiation strategy is potentially adverse because the information 
used to arrive at the preliminary allocation determination can be 
sensitive to a PRP's status among its co-defendants. 135 Because each 
127 [d. § 9622(e)(3). 
128 [d. § 9622(e)(3)(A). 
129 [d. 
130 Superfund Program: Nonbinding Preliminary Allocations of Responsibility, 52 Fed. Reg. 
19,919 (1987) [hereinafter NBAR Guidelines]. 
131 See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text. 
132 See NBAR Guidelines, supra note 130, at 19,919. 
133 42 U.S.C. § 9622(e)(3)(C) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
134 [d. 
135 See Mays, supra note 112, at 242-43. "[Sjome attorneys representing PRPs are not 
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defendant faces joint and several liability, 136 EPA or a group of PRPs 
negotiating a settlement agreement can exert a tremendous amount 
of settlement pressure upon a recalcitrant PRP, even though it may 
be forced to bear a disproportionate share of the clean-up costs as 
allocated by the NBAR. An attorney representing multiple PRPs 
must balance delicate allegiances if one of his or her clients in the 
group is a PRP who refuses to agree to a settlement proposal ap-
proved by its co-defendants. 137 
When negotiations involve a large number of PRPs it is not always 
possible to bring all concerned parties into agreement. 138 NBARs 
are the first impression parties have of the potential allocation of 
liability and may seem relatively painless. Their psychological influ-
ence on a group of PRPs, however, should not be underestimated, 
as NBARs can pressure parties to settle when it is not in their best 
interests to do so. 139 
The peer pressure associated with the use of NBARs can also 
affect the settlement of small or de minimis claims. When a PRP's 
potential liability is small or de minimis, according to section 
122(g)(1) of CERCLA,140 a conflict of interest can arise if the pro-
posed settlement does not reflect the party's liability accurately. De 
minimis contributors are generally willing to pay their share of the 
clean-up costs early in the response process in order to avoid exces-
sive legal fees and publicity.141 Subsequently targeted PRPs, how-
ever, may seek contribution from these de minimis parties before 
settlement is reached if the original allocation estimates prove to be 
inaccurate. 142 By settling with these de minimis PRPs before other 
PRPs can dispute their relative shares of liability, EPA creates a 
potential conflict for the attorney who represents both de minimis 
parties and more culpable PRPs or PRPs allegedly contributing 
larger volumes of waste. 
anxious to have NBARs prepared in their cases, fearing that EPA's NBAR will be difficult 
to overcome should they disagree with the allocation." Id. at 242. 
136 See supra notes 88-103 and accompanying text. 
137 See Hickok & Padleschat, Strategic Consideration in Defending and Settling a Superfund 
Case, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 1213, 1214 (authors note that EPA's settlement policies are 
problematic in multiparty contexts and may be doomed by apportionment disagreements). 
138Id. 
139Id. 
140 See 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(I) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
141 See Mays, supra note 112, at 246. 
142 See supra notes 121-28 and accompanying text for a discussion of the internal debate 
within section 113(0(1) and (2) of CERCLA regarding the conflicting policies of contribution 
protection and the right to contribution. 
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Similarly, mixed funding, the combining of Superfund and PRP 
funds for the purpose of site cleanup, can create conflicts of interest 
for attorneys defending mUltiple PRPs in the same action. Under 
section 122(b)(1) of CERCLA,143 EPA can agree to "reimburse the 
parties ... from the Fund, with interest, for certain costs of which 
[EPA] has agreed to finance. "144 This provision allows a settlement 
to proceed even when several major PRPs are holding up negotia-
tions. 145 EPA can use the Fund to pay those clean-up costs that 
would otherwise be borne by the PRPs refusing to join the proposed 
settlement. The Agency then pursues the recalcitrant PRPs in order 
to recover the Fund's share of the costS. 146 
Because either the Fund itself or recalcitrant PRPs are liable for 
any remedial costs not covered by the original settlement,147 firms 
representing settled parties during negotiations may face charges of 
impropriety if they attempt to defend the non settling parties in a 
subsequent proceeding. This "assignment" of contribution rights by 
the settled parties may remove a direct conflict of interest, although 
a Canon 9 charge of giving the appearance of impropriety may still 
exist. 148 
IV. TYPES OF SUPERFUND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
No court has yet addressed an attorney's conflict of interest arising 
out of a multiple representation of Superfund defendants. Conse-
quently, there is no case law that directly resolves the issues and 
questions raised in this Comment. By placing what has been analyzed 
in purely theoretical terms into a more concrete setting of attorney-
client relationships, the following hypotheticals allow the reader to 
draw a practical understanding of the ways conflicts of interest arise 
in Superfund proceedings. 
For example, adverse interests arise between multiple PRPs when 
one party settles with EPA and then pursues contribution claims 
against other, non settling PRPs. This situation is likely to occur 
when large generators settle and then seek contribution from de 
minimis contributors who settled at an earlier time. 149 In this scen-
143 42 U.S.C. § 9622(b)(1). 
144Id. 
145 See Mays, supra note 112, at 245. 
146Id. 
147 Id. at 246-47. 
148 MODEL CODE, supra note 13, Canon 9. 
149 See supra notes 141-45 and accompanying text. 
394 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 17:371 
ario, a law firm that simultaneously represents both a de minimis 
contributor and a large generator during negotiations with EPA is 
likely to face disqualification should the dispute result in litigation. 150 
At the outset, the attorney might have believed that the interests 
of the two parties were "generally aligned"151 and that multiple 
representation was permissible "even though there [was] some dif-
ference of interest among them. "152 Thus, if the attorney's belief was 
reasonable and both clients provided their informed consent to the 
representation, Rule 1. 7 would permit the representation. 153 Once 
the contribution action is pursued, however, the parties' interests 
become adverse and counsel must withdraw, forcing both clients to 
seek and retain new representation. 
Such a conflict of interest can be avoided if a group of PRPs share 
similar interests and obligations. For instance, two PRPs who op-
erate in the same community may feel mutually obligated to conduct 
clean-up measures due to the value of their status and relationship 
with that community. 154 In general, however, PRPs in anyone class 
share a common desire to limit their respective liability, although 
the amount of clean-up costs allocated to one party will affect anoth-
er's liability. This type of threshold conflict can arise in virtually 
every mUltiple representation of PRPs, but may not be a factor 
when the group of clients maintain continuing relationships within 
the industry.155 When parties maintain business relationships, any 
possible contribution award may amount to relatively little when 
compared to the loss of future business that would result. 
Many law firms may face more subtle conflict problems, particu-
larly when their practice is diverse. For example, assume that a firm 
represents an owner/operator of a waste disposal site currently ne-
gotiating its responsibility for clean-up costs with EPA. A past 
landowner of the same site, however, is also a client who has been 
represented by the same firm on a regular basis, occasionally in 
environmental matters. If the past landowner is eventually targeted 
150 This situation is particularly likely when the de minimis contributor settles early in the 
negotiating process with EPA and subsequently discovers new facts indicating that the gen-
erator was in fact responsible for the clean-up costs covered by the settlement. 
151 MODEL RULES, supra note 12, Rule 1. 7 comment. 
152Id. 
153Id. 
154 See, e.g., Kingson, $24 Million Accord Reached on Toxic Cleanup, N. Y. Times, Feb. 1, 
1989, at A13, col. 3. A spokeswoman for a past landowner said, "[wle certainly feel we have 
an obligation to do this kind of cleanup," referring to the real estate concern's agreement to 
pay 50% of the remaining costs, despite not owning the land since 1934. Id. 
155 See infra notes 185-86 and accompanying text. 
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as a PRP on the basis of his or her past activities at the same site, 
the firm may be involved in a conflict of interest even though the 
landowner retains another firm as its counsel in this matter.156 The 
firm may thus be precluded from representing one or both parties 
on the basis of its representation of the past landowner. This preclu-
sion is likely if the owner/operator contends that the past landowner 
is primarily responsible for the presence of hazardous wastes at the 
dump site. 157 
V. THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF THE MODEL RULES IN RESOLVING 
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN COMPLEX TORT LITIGATION 
Because no court has yet addressed a conflict of interest arising 
out of a Superfund proceeding, it is necessary to understand how 
courts have treated conflicts of interest in analogous areas of the 
law. In other complex tort areas, however, case law reveals the 
difficulty of enforcing ethical code provisions when the interests of 
all involved parties are not fully realized. For instance, in Duca v. 
Raymark Industries, 158 the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania addressed conflicts arising from 
multiple representation of parties in asbestos litigation. Duca in-
volved cross-claims pursued by eight unsettled co-defendants to es-
tablish the joint liability of two other co-defendants who had set-
tled. 159 If the court found that the settled parties were jointly liable, 
then the unsettled defendants could limit their liability by the 
amount of damages already paid by the settled parties. 160 
Because the law firm that represented the unsettled parties also 
represented the settled defendants in other asbestos actions, a po-
tential conflict arose. 161 Although the settled defendants no longer 
had a financial interest in the cross-claims being considered by the 
court,162 a judgment rendering them joint tortfeasors could have 
affected their interests in future actions by virtue of the decision's 
156 See generally Marden Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1986). In this 
case the seller of a plant at which hazardous substances were deposited negotiated a release 
from all actions relating to the plant with the buyer in the purchase agreement. The buyer, 
however, sought contribution from the owner after being targeted as a PRP by EPA. Id. 
157 See supra notes 42-55 and accompanying text. 
158 663 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Pa. 1986). 
159 I d. at 186. 
160 Id. at 187. 
161Id. 
162 All that was at stake in this action was the amount of the judgment against the nonsettled 
parties. Id. 
396 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 17:371 
collateral estoppel effect.163 Furthermore, the firm risked compro-
mising its zealous representation of the unsettled defendants due to 
its obligation of loyalty to the settled defendants as both prior and 
potential clients. 164 
Despite these risks, the Duca court ruled that, if the parties' 
consent was fully informed, the potential conflicts were not severe 
enough to warrant disqualification because the firm was not repre-
senting divergent interests in the same litigation. 165 Moreover, the 
Duca court rejected the argument that the multiple representation 
violated Canon 9's prohibition against the appearance of impropriety. 
It concluded that conduct falling short of violating Canons 4 and 5 
should not invoke disqualification under a Canon that has been char-
acterized by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals as "necessarily 
vague" and "overly broad and question-begging."166 
More significantly, the Duca court addressed the unique situation 
presented by cross-claims used to obtain contribution or to limit a 
party's liability in complex modern tort litigation. 167 The court found 
that large complex proceedings have diverged significantly from the 
traditional adversary model out of which the disciplinary rules 
emerged and to which they have most often been applied. 168 
Although the Duca decision does not address all the various hy-
pothetical situations that can create adverse interests,169 and hence 
conflicts, in Superfund proceedings, it suggests a rationale that can 
be applied when addressing both actual and potential conflicts under 
CERCLA. Superfund has created a type of representation that in-
volves a complicated web of interrelationships among defendants 
and potential defendants. This representation differs significantly 
from the adversary model used in developing both the Model Rules 
163 I d. at 189. 
164 Id. at 190-91. 
165Id. at 191. 
166 Id. (quoting In re Eastern Sugar Antitrust Litig., 697 F.2d 524, 530 (3d Cir. 1982». 
Although the public's regard for the Bar is a central concern to the Bar, many of the circuit 
courts, including the Third Circuit, regard Canon 9 as largely a redundancy of Canons 4 and 
5. Although there are cases in which a violation of Canon 9 was enough to warrant disquali-
fication, it is an unusual situation where the "appearance of impropriety" is sufficient to 
warrant such action by the courts. But see United States v. Miller, 624 F.2d 1198 (3d Cir. 
1980); IBM v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1979) (disqualification based, in part, upon Canon 
9). 
167 663 F. Supp. at 184. 
168 I d. at 186. 
169 This Comment, however, raises many of these situations. See supra notes 89-165 and 
accompanying text. 
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and the Model Code. 170 In enacting CERCLA, Congress not only 
wanted to establish an equitable process, but also wanted a proce-
dure that would require responsible parties to respond promptly in 
order to avert a serious threat to the environment and the public 
health. l7l Furthermore, the expertise required to represent a party 
in a Superfund proceeding, coupled with the costs of retaining such 
representation, limits PRPs' alternatives in choosing counsel. In a 
case involving a large number of PRPs, it might be difficult for a 
party to locate a firm that has both the expertise necessary to 
represent the party and does not have potential conflicts that may 
impair its representation. 
When considering these policy issues and the legal market con-
straints that a PRP faces, the reasoning applied by the Duca court 
appears sound. If a PRP consents to a firm's multiple representation 
after full disclosure, and if the firm reasonably believes that its 
representation of that PRP will not be adversely affected, then 
representation of mUltiple PRPs should be allowed. If the legal 
community is to abide by its ethical codes, then an attorney's rea-
sonable belief and a client's fully informed consent, obtained pur-
suant to Rule 1.7, should be enough to fulfill an attorney's ethical 
obligations. 172 
Nonetheless, the reasonable belief standard remains an insur-
mountable obstacle to a firm that understands fully the myriad con-
flicts that can potentially arise when it represents multiple defen-
dants in a Superfund proceeding. 173 If this ethical standard is going 
to be considered by courts adjudicating conflict problems in CER-
CLA proceedings, then there must be a change in the way courts 
interpret the Model Rules in complex tort litigation. 
170 The ethical codes consider representations that facilitate the role of the lawyer as 
negotiator, mediator, and advisor. The codes, however, do not provide enough substantive 
guidance on recognizing adverse interests in these settings. Conflict problems can occur during 
negotiations with EPA, but attorneys are given much more latitude under Rule 1. 7(b) where 
clients' interests are "generally aligned ... even though there is some difference of interest 
among them." MODEL RULES, supra note 12, Rule 1.7 comment. 
In order to meet the objectives of CERCLA, however, an attorney must juggle all of these 
roles while balancing the delicate allegiance of several parties. It seems clear that hazardous 
waste cleanups are not facilitated by the zealous advocate needed in a trial situation, the 
setting for which ethical codes are tailored. 
171 See generally SARA, Pub. L. No. 99-499; 1986 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS (100 
Stat.) 2836-38. 
172 See supra notes 17-42 and accompanying text. 
173 See supra notes 88-138 and accompanying text for a discussion of conflict potential in 
Superfund settlement negotiations. 
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VI. POSSIBLE REFORMS 
The Duca court's holding does not solve the problems ,that this 
Comment has analyzed. Rather, it' merely recogniz~s that complex 
tort and environmental litigation is not reconciled easily with either 
the Model Rules or the Model Code. Therefore, the Duca decision 
provides little solace to an attorney faced with actual conflicts of 
interests among clients involved in the same Superfund proceeding. 
Reforms must come from both the judiciary and EPA if this problem 
is to be resolved adequately. 
The courts must realize that CERCLA's objectives are best met 
through a united effort by all the various defendants and by EPA. 
Therefore, the reasonable belief standard of Model Rules 1. 7 and 1.9 
should be applied to the group of PRPs a firm represents as a whole, 
rather than to each individual party within that group. In other 
words, to determine whether multiple representation is going to 
serve the interests of all PRPs, a lawyer should be permitted to 
weigh the likelihood and magnitude of a possible conflict of interest 
against the benefits a multiple representation provides to the parties 
and to the conduct of the prbceedings. 174 If the benefits outweigh 
the detriments and the involved clients provide their informed con-
sent, then the multiple representation should be regarded as per-
missible under the Model Rules. 
If a party challenges the propriety of an attorney's representation, 
then the courts should attempt to isolate the issues that are more 
likely to create conflicts of interest from the rest of the dispute. 
Trial judges have broad discretion in the order of their proceed-
ings.175 Issuing bifurcation orders can separate the conflict-of-inter-
est issues and make Superfund cases more manageable. 
In addition to this change by the courts, EPA must address the 
potential for conflicts of interest that result from its current practice 
in pursuing and settling CERCLA cases. 176 Information, such as the 
relative volume of substances found at a site, should be provided to 
parties as soon as it is available, as a matter of policy and practice. 177 
This early disclosure will enable attorneys who are considering the 
174 Commentary, Wheat v. United States, NAT'L RPTR. ON LEGAL ETHICS 97 (1988) (rec-
ommending a similar method of evaluating the reasonableness of multiple representations in 
a criminal trial context). 
175 FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b). 
176 See supra notes 67-129 and accompanying text for a discussion of the conflict-engendering 
policies of EPA. 
177 See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
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viability of a simultaneous mUltiple representation to assess all the 
factors that can create a conflict of interest and potentially compro-
mise his or her clients' positions. 
The avoidance of conflicts of interest should not be the responsi-
bility of the courts and EPA alone. Practitioners and PRPs can also 
prevent the occurrence of this problem by considering potential 
conflicts of interest before retaining counsel, or subsequently im-
pleading a large number of third-party defendants. A united effort 
by all parties involved in a Superfund proceeding can avoid the 
potential conflicts of interest explored in this Comment and can 
ensure that CERCLA's objectives are met without an unnecessary 
increase in litigation costs or case complexity. 
If a group of defendants in a Superfund case cannot agree on an 
allocation formula, and the allocation dispute or contribution action 
goes to litigation, then the court can design a rational organization 
of the issues and prevent the occurrence of a conflict of interest 
through bifurcation. 178 A common form of bifurcation is to separate 
cost-allocation issues from total damage and liability issues. 179 Bifur-
cating these issues allows a defendant to avoid having to litigate 
response-cost allocation if that defendant prevails in an earlier pro-
ceeding regarding liability.180 By removing a party from the pro-
ceeding at the liability stage of a case, the likelihood that a conflict 
of interest will arise when allocation is considered is eliminated. 
Moreover, to the extent that there are conflicting interests, resolu-
tion of those interests can usually be postponed through an agree-
ment to reserve claims inter se until after resolution of common 
defenses. 181 
Similarly, bifurcation can extend the time permitted to a group of 
PRPs and allow them to present a more effective and united settle-
ment proposal, which will assist both the court and the EPA. 182 For 
instance, while a court concentrates on the liability of the various 
defendants, a more acceptable allocation formula can be negotiated. 
In this way, bifurcation can be used as a device for facilitating 
settlements by extending the time frame during which parties can 
178 Hickok & Padleschat, supra note 137, at 1221-22. 
179 [d. 
180 [d. at 1221. 
181 The prevalent use of inter se agreements among PRPs engaging joint counsel was 
discovered through conversations and correspondence with several practitioners involved in 
large Superfund negotiations and settlements. Again, at the interviewees' request, their names 
are not cited. 
182 See Hickok & Padleschat, supra note 137, at 1221-22. 
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resolve issues that may ultimately create conflicts and prolong the 
suit. 
United States v. Conservation Chemical CO.l83 illustrates a bifur-
cation order issued under this rationale. In this case, the United 
States District Court for the Western District of Missouri ordered 
a bifurcation directing an initial trial on liability and damages, with 
the subsequent trial reserved for apportionment issues. l84 Such an 
order has potential influence on eventual settlements. For example, 
defendants who were unwilling to settle may discover a change of 
heart when a number of PRPs avoid liability at the initial trial. 
Because the remedial costs must then be apportioned among fewer 
defendants, those recalcitrant parties may be more willing to settle, 
rather than risk being held to a greater share of liability. Although 
this type of settlement pressure may not be in the best interests of 
all parties involved, avoiding litigation over the question of appor-
tionment is one way to avoid an actual conflict of interest and sub-
sequent withdrawal by counsel. 
Before a multiple representation of PRPs ever reaches litigation, 
an attorney assessing the reasonableness of such a representation 
must consider the probability that the various interests of the clients 
will become adverse. If there is a potential conflict, the attorney 
must consider whether the representation would be compromised if 
the conflict actually arises. But a worst-case scenario should be 
balanced against the relative benefits of the representation, such as 
a coordinated defense strategy, enhanced negotiations, reduced legal 
expenses, and a greater likelihood that the defendants will agree on 
a settlement proposal. Other, more intangible benefits, such as the 
continued good will among the parties aligned in a united defense, 
are relevant when one PRP is a client, supplier, or customer of 
another PRP. In this situation, the continued relationships between 
the parties may ultimately be more valuable than a successful con-
tribution claim. This consideration will make a multiple representa-
tion more reasonable, because the probability that the parties' in-
terests will become adverse is relatively low and the benefits of the 
representation are great. 
A multiple representation limited to one class of PRPs, such as 
only those parties connected to one type of waste found at a partic-
ular site, is a simple example of the type of prior analysis of the 
relationships between potential clients that can be used to avoid 
183 106 F.R.D. 210, 215 (W.D. Mo. 1985). 
184 [d. at 215-16. 
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conflicts of interest. For example, a transporter who has maintained 
a continuing relationship with a particular treater of hazardous 
wastes is less likely to dispute allocation with that treater if such 
conduct would jeopardize the transporter's future business. If the 
two parties' interests eventually conflict, they can postpone the res-
olution of those interests until all common defense issues have been 
resolved. Even after these latter issues are resolved, the parties 
may be more likely to reach a friendly settlement between them-
selves. 
By utilizing these relationships, developed through years of inter-
action within the industry, multiple representations can minimize 
transactional costs incurred through lengthy litigation. These sav-
ings can then be applied to clean-up costS. 185 The number of law 
firms that have the capability of handling complex environmental 
tort defenses is typically much smaller than the number of PRPs 
that may be involved in anyone Superfund case. 186 Arguably, de-
veloping a successful settlement proposal is easier and more feasible 
when counsel can act as mediator, and can focus on reducing the 
overall settlement costs of the group of clients, rather than solely 
concentrating on anyone client's share of liability. Therefore, courts 
should disqualify counsel only when the probability that the defen-
dants' interests will become adverse is very high, and when the 
conflict will jeopardize settlement negotiations or compromise the 
defendants' litigation strategies. 
For instance, a firm should not be permitted to represent multiple 
parties when it has clients on either side of a contribution action. In 
such a situation, a PRP's financial costs in retaining new counsel 
may substantially outweigh what it hopes to gain through contri-
bution from other PRPs. Increased delay in litigation and greater 
case complexity occur as more parties are dragged into the proceed-
ings. Valuable time is spent allowing newly retained counsel to be-
come familiar with the case. When the potential for conflicts of 
interest is extreme and the degree of harm to the parties is serious, 
a firm cannot be permitted to represent multiple PRPs. 
One possible approach to avoid the possibility of a conflict of 
interest created through third-party contribution claims is to insti-
tute alternative dispute resolutions when developing an allocation 
formula for the apportionment of remedial costs among defendants. 
186 See Hickok & Padleschat, supra note 137, at 1218 n.26. 
186 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
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For instance, in United States v. Laskin,187 twenty companies that 
allegedly sent more than de minimis volumes of waste to the Polar/ 
Laskin site were nonetheless not named by EPA as potentially re-
sponsible parties. 188 These companies agreed to settle potential third-
party claims through an alternative dispute resolution in return for 
a deferral of third-party claims in court. 189 
This unique approach employs mediators and negotiations to settle 
contribution claims before the parties resort to the courtS. I90 The 
parties are free to devise their own procedure for the alternative 
dispute resolution that will enable the firms involved to circumvent 
potential conflicts before the matter ever reaches governmental in-
volvement or litigation. 191 Generally, the process calls for the ap-
pointment of a qualified "neutral" or "neutral panel" to serve as both 
a mediator and a decision maker. 192 The potential phases involved in 
this type of allocation procedure are: (1) investigation and fact find-
ing; (2) position statements by the PRPs; (3) neutral attempts to 
achieve agreement through mediation; (4) alternative dispute reso-
lution, such as arbitration or mini-trial; (5) cost-allocation determi-
nation by a neutral party; and (6) acceptance of the determination. 193 
By using this approach, each PRP can know its share of clean-up 
costs, and reduce its exposure to joint and several liability. In ad-
dition, this process places the PRPs in a position to cooperate with 
one another and eliminates or reduces the need for cross-claims and 
the possible conflicts of interest that such claims create. l94 N ever-
theless, it would behoove a group of PRPs attempting to allocate 
response liabilities privately to enlist the aid of local environmental 
officials. Such assistance would minimize possible public criticism 
and the susceptibility of a lawsuit should a settlement create dissat-
isfaction and controversy among interested citizens. 195 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The legal community's ethical codes do not adequately resolve the 
potential conflicts of interest that arise in Superfund proceedings. 
187 No. C84-20354 (N.D. Ohio filed June 6, 1984). 
188 See Kowalski, Towards a Cost-Effective and Just Resolution of Potential Third-Party 
Claims under Superfund: The Laskin Proposal, 9 CHEM. & RADIATION WASTE LIT. REP. 
640, 645 (1985). 
189Id. 
190 Id. 
191 I d. at 645-48. 
192 HAZ. WASTE LITIG. REP. 7475-76 (Andrews Publications) (June 3, 1985). 
193Id. at 7476. 
194 Id. 
195 See Hickok & Padleschat, supra note 137, at 1225. 
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Furthermore, EPA's policies in pursuing and settling liability under 
CERCLA engender conflicts of interest among parties retaining 
joint counsel. Because PRPs cannot always afford or rely on retain-
ing individual representation in these proceedings, a serious problem 
exists that strains the resources of the limited number of law firms 
practicing environmental law. Consequently, this Comment advo-
cates a more flexible approach to mUltiple representations in CER-
CLA actions. 
This approach must recognize the values of multiple representa-
tions as well as the potential conflicts of interest. In many ways, 
multiple representations facilitate the cleanup of hazardous wastes. 
When a cooperative approach is possible, mUltiple representations 
can reduce legal costs, decrease the length of time needed to resolve 
the allocation of clean-up costs, and increase the likelihood that 
parties can reach an equitable settlement with EPA. To a degree, 
what is needed is precisely what the Model Rules provide: a flexible 
and workable approach to ethical standards that allows an honest 
practitioner to make decisions consistent with both the principles of 
the legal profession and the needs of the client. 
Although the voluntary consent test fulfills its purpose, it does so 
only to the point where the legal community adheres to the "in-
formed" requirement of that test. In the context of a Superfund 
proceeding, that requirement can be strenuous, but the benefits it 
promotes far outweigh the detriments. 
